
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station




Return to Service Plan Update

July 16, 2002



Introduction



Lew Myers FENOC Chief Operating Officer



Desired Outcomes

- Demonstrate Return to Service Plan Implementation toward safe, reliable and sustainable operation
- Provide status of several Building Blocks
- Demonstrate closure of actions from the previous meeting
- Introduce status of Management and Human Performance Excellence Plan



Basic Building Blocks

Return to Service Plan

Reactor Head Resolution Plan

Bob Schrauder

Program Compliance Plan

Jim Powers

Containment Health
Assurance Plan
Randy Fast

Restart Overview Panel

Restart Action Plan

Howard Bergendahl

System Health Assurance Plan

Jim Powers

Restart and Post-Restart Test Plan

Randy Fast

Management and Human Performance Excellence Plan


Lew Myers

Restart Overview Panel





DAVIS-BESSE SITE ORGANIZATION





Bob Schrauder Reactor Head Resolution Oversight



Progress

 Replacement Head activities support safe and reliable plant return to service during Fourth Quarter 2002.




Midland Activities

- Containment access opening complete
- Service Structure Inspection Access Modification complete
- Non-Destructive Examinations satisfactorily completed
- Final cleaning and preparation for shipping underway



Cutting Containment Liner



Containment Access Opening







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






























Davis-Besse Activities

- RPV Head being prepared for removal
- Construction procedures submitted to FENOC for review and approval
- Engineering Packages nearing completion
- Containment Building opening preparation underway
- Containment restoration to include Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test to confirm Containment integrity








Davis-Besse Activities


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Containment Health Plan Implementation Status



Randy Fast Plant Manager Jim Powers
Director - Engineering



Containment Health Plan Implementation Status

- Plan scope increased to encompass overall Containment Health
 - Containment Vessel Evaluation
 - Environmental Qualification Equipment Evaluation
 - Containment Emergency Sump Evaluation
 - Decay Heat Valve Pit
 - Containment Air Coolers
- System Health Plan revised to include systems outside Containment that contain boric acid




Containment Health Plan Implementation Status

- Revised Field Inspector Training Program
- Procedures in place for inspections
- Validation of inspections in progress
- Independent inspections with qualified personnel




Qualifying Painters






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


Qualifying Painters



2.8

System Health Assurance Plan Implementation Status



Howard Bergendah! Vice President - Nuclear



System Health Assurance Plan Implementation Status

Operational Readiness Reviews

Complete

System Readiness Reviews

- Risk Significant Maintenance Rule Systems
- Focus on material condition
- Include system walkdowns




System Health Assurance Plan Implementation Status

Latent Issues Reviews

- Detailed look at system design and include detailed system walkdowns
 - Reactor Coolant System
 - Auxiliary Feedwater System
 - Component Cooling Water System
 - Emergency Diesel Generators
 - Service Water System




Decay Heat Pump Work





Scaffold Work Continues





Program Compliance Plans Implementation Status

Phase 1 - Program Readiness

- Baseline assessment of plant programs
- Results presented to the Program Review Board

Phase 2 - Detailed Program Reviews

 Expectations have been established for In-Depth systematic review of programs related to degradation of head




Program Compliance Plan Implementation Status

Phase 2 - Reviews Include:

- Pilot Review: Probabilistic Safety Assessment Program
- Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
- Inservice Inspection Program
- Plant Modification Program
- Corrective Action Program
- Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Program
- Operating Experience



Management and Human Performance Excellence Plan Introduction



Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer



Management Root Cause Introduction

Conclusion:

 Management ineffectively implemented processes, and thus failed to detect and address plant problems as opportunities arose

Four Key Focus Areas Identified:

- Ownership
- Oversight
- Standards
- Decision-making



Management Root Cause Introduction

Initial Assessments:


- Standards have existed for many years that lacked rigor in problem solving
- Strong management / leadership tends to improve performance, teamwork and ownership
- Lack of management oversight has resulted in lax rigor in process implementation
- Questioning attitude is not evident in decision making



Approach:

- Baseline from Technical Root Cause
- Outside Experts Utilized
- Dedicated Investigation Team





Steve Loehlein Root Cause Team Leader



Purpose:

 Understand why, over a period of years, Davis-Besse personnel failed to identify corrosion of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head base metal.



Team Composition:

- Technical Root Cause Leader
- Root Cause qualified FENOC employees
- FENOC Oversight Support
- Process Expertise -- Conger & Elsea
- Davis-Besse Management Personnel

Overview:

- INPO Organizational Effectiveness Expert



Root Cause Team



Approach and Status:

- Scope Development
 - Technical Root Cause results
 - Four Focused areas for review:
 - RPV Head
 - Pressurizer Spray Valve (RC-2)
 - Containment Air Coolers
 - Radiation Monitor Filters




In-Depth Evaluations:

- Event and Causal Factors chart and Barrier Analysis techniques are being employed
- Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) technique in process
- MORT Analysis Sections
 - Technical Information Systems
 - Corrective Action Program
 - Hazard Analysis Process
 - Task Performance Errors
 - Management Support / Oversight
- Corrective Actions will be recommended based on conclusions of data analysis



MORT Analysis



Preliminary Insights:

- Standards have existed for many years that lacked rigor in problem solving
- Strong management / leadership tends to improve performance, teamwork and ownership
- Lack of management oversight has resulted in lax rigor in process implementation
- Questioning attitude is not evident in decision making





Lew Myers FENOC Chief Operating Officer



- Demonstrated movement of our Building Blocks from Planning, Discovery, and into Implementation
- We have taken strong actions to incorporate comments from our Restart Oversight Panel and the NRC
- We are taking management actions that are substantial and demonstrative



Management Action:

- New positions of Chief Operating Officer, Executive Vice President of Engineering, and Vice President of Nuclear Oversight to ensure good operation and performance standards
- New Senior Management Team and a strong management team is now present with proven leadership



Management Action:

- We are providing a case study with all of our employees to set an expectation that a change in ownership and standards are required
- We are re-baselining our standards and clearly reinforcing these standards in each department
 - New Engineering Standards of Excellence
 - New Engineering Assessment Board
 - Plant Manager now chairing our Corrective Action Review Board
 - New Operations leadership to ensure a plant operational focus



Management Action:

 Building Teamwork between managers and supervisors/line workers



Conclusions

We continue to be committed to a comprehensive approach to ensure Davis-Besse is ready for safe and reliable operation and sustainable performance.



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